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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-l/14/83 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2. 
Respondent, 
-and- " ~" "CASE1^O7'U-^517 
FRED GREENBERG. 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (PAUL H. JANIS. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
FOARD & ROSOFF. ESQS. (DAVID M. ROSOFF, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Fred 
Greenberg to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his 
charge that United Federation of Teachers. Local 2 (UFT) 
violated its duty to represent him fairly. UFT represents a 
unit of teachers employed by the City School District of the 
City of New York (District) and Greenberg is such a teacher. 
As particularized by Greenberg, the charge alleges 
that UFT failed to support him adequately in connection with 
problems that he had with the District. It specifies five 
instances of such alleged inadequacy. The record shows that 
in each instance UFT denied him the service he requested. 
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The hearing officer determined, however, that in each of the 
five instances. Greenberg was seeking services from UFT 
which UFT does not provide to others and which the Taylor 
Law does not obligate it to provide. 
-
 ;
 - - - - - T h e ^ — r 
did not afford Greenberg services in connection with 
problems that did not involve the District. One was that it 
did not protect him against an assault by the step-parent of 
a student. The other was that it did not protect him 
against the disappearance of property he left in his desk. 
With respect to these instances, too, the hearing officer 
determined that Greenberg was seeking services from UFT 
which UFT does not provide to others and which the Taylor 
Law does not obligate it to provide. 
Finally, the charge alleges that by refusing to submit 
its denial of those requested services to a review procedure 
made available through the American Federation of Teachers, 
UFT's parent organization. UFT had committed an independent 
violation. The hearing officer ruled at the hearing that 
this allegation could not set forth an independent violation 
under the charge before her because the event complained 
about occurred after the charge was filed. 
Greenberg's exceptions complain that the hearing 
officer excluded testimony which would have shown that UFT 
is zealous in the protection of the rights of unit employees 
whom it favors but ignores the rights of those in disfavor. 
Board - U-5517 -3 
and that, in any event, the evidence supports his 
charge.— 
The hearing ran three days with the testimony covering 
356 pages. While Greenberg was not given complete freedom 
to^ r^jesjent__his^  testj^ ojny i^ri the orderin which he wished to 
do so. he was given more than sufficient opportunity to 
present his case. Notwithstanding the latitude given to 
him, the hearing officer found that his testimony often 
dealt with irrelevant matters and that it did not establish 
any of the specifications of his charge. Having reviewed 
the record, we determine that she committed no prejudicial 
A'Greenberg1s exceptions make three other arguments. 
They argue that the hearing officer refused to consolidate 
the instant charge with a later charge filed by Greenberg 
and that the hearing officer did not permit him to prove the 
close relationship between UFT and NYSUT. As to the first 
of these., we note that the factual basis of the later 
charge, which was dismissed for failure to set forth a prima 
facie case, was not related to the instant charge. 
Accordingly, it could not have been an abuse of discretion 
for the hearing officer to refuse to consolidate them. As 
to the second, we conclude that the relationship between UFT 
and NYSUT was not relevant to the basis of the hearing 
officer's decision. 
Finally. Greenberg argues that in dismissing that part 
of his charge which alleged UFT refused to represent him in 
an improper practice case where he filed the charge pro se. 
the hearing officer failed to consider his allegation that 
UFT "did not offer an alternative remedy". However, the. 
record contains no evidence in support of this allegation. 
Therefore, on the record before her. the hearing officer 
could well have understood that Greenberg had narrowed his 
complaint to UFT's refusal to prosecute the improper 
practice charge. Accordingly, she did not err by ignoring 
the unsubstantiated allegation. 
..... 8C82 
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error in her conduct of the hearing and we affirm her 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
We have held that an employee organization violates 
its duty of fair representation if it denies a service to a 
unit_ em^ ^^  
improperly motivated, irresponsible or grossly negligent. 
(Brighton Transportation Association, 10 PERB 1f3090 
[1977]). UFT's decisions not to provide Greenberg with any 
of the services which were the subject of the charge herein 
were deliberately made and could not involve negligence. On 
the record before us, we find no evidence that these 
decisions were improperly motivated or irresponsible. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: January 14. 1981 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
mm* 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B-1/14/83 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE BRIDGE AUTHORITY CASE NO. E-0846 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
ISADORE SHAPIRO. ESQ.. for Employer 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (WILLIAM M. 
WALLENS. ESQ., of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The New York State Bridge Authority (Authority) 
operates five bridges across the Hudson River. Each bridge 
has a bridge manager and an assistant bridge manager. The 
Authority also has 100 employees who collect tolls and 
maintain the bridges. On April 30, 1982. the Authority 
applied for the designation of the five bridge managers and 
five assistant bridge managers as managerial. The Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA). which represents 
the employees of the Authority, opposed the application. 
In support of its application, the Authority submitted 
the job descriptions for the bridge manager and assistant 
bridge manager positions. Among other things, the job 
description for the bridge manager position provides for 
meetings with the executive director and deputy executive 
director "for the purpose of formulating policy with 
reference to all bridges . . . ." The job description also 
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provides that the manager will 
assist the Authority in contract negotiations for 
employees under his supervision and in addition 
will sit as representative of the Authority 
during labor-management sessions. 
Representatives of the Authority and CSEA apparently 
~ " re^ 
is actually performed by the bridge managers and assistant 
bridge managers. A statement of the duties actually 
performed was prepared by the trial examiner and sent to 
counsel for both parties. She indicated that unless the 
parties wished to submit additional evidence or to challenge 
the facts set forth in her statement of duties, those facts 
would constitute the record. The statement was accepted by 
the Authority. 
Based upon the information contained in the trial 
examiner's statement, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) concluded that the 
functions performed by the bridge managers are not 
managerial within the meaning of the Taylor Law. It 
followed, according to the Director, that the assistant 
managers were not managerial. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Authority. In support of its exceptions, the Authority 
argues that the Director erred by relying solely upon the 
facts specified in the trial examiner's statement of 
duties. It contends that he should also have considered the 
Board - E-0846 , -3 
job descriptions which were appended to the application. 
While it concedes that some of the duties contained in the 
job descriptions were not actually performed, it argues that 
it could reasonably require the managers and assistant 
managers to perform all those duties and would have done so 
but for the fact that they are in the CSEA unit. CSEA 
responds that by agreeing that the trial examiner's 
statement of duties contained all the relevant facts, the 
Authority waived reliance upon the job descriptions. 
We do not find that the job descriptions cited by the 
Authority add anything significant to the information 
contained in the trial examiner's statement. The statement 
sets forth that which the managers and assistant managers 
actually do. To the extent that the job descriptions set 
forth additional duties, those duties were not actually 
performed but were within the range of duties that might 
have been assigned. The record, however, does not show that 
these potentially additional duties would constitute a 
managerial, rather than a supervisory, function. 
The job descriptions refer to formulation of policy by 
the managers, but that term does not appear to have the same 
meaning in that document as it does in the Taylor Law. In 
its brief, the Authority argues that the bridge managers 
formulate policy because they have considerable discretion 
in "determining the methods, means and personnel by which 
Board - E-0846 
the business of the Authority is carried out". We have 
held, however, that for Taylor Law purposes: 
To formulate policy is to participate with 
regularity in the essential process involving the 
determination of the goals and objectives of the 
government involved, and of the methods for 
accomplishing those goals and objectives that 
have a substantia 1 j.m^ ac_t upon thei affairs and 
the constituency of the^ b^ erTim~elTtn The 
formulation of policy does not extend to the 
determination of methods of operation that are 
merely of a technical nature. Binqhamton, 
12 PERB ir3099 at p. 3185 (1979). 
Nothing in the record, including the job descriptions, 
suggests such a role for the bridge manager. 
Similarly, on the record before us, we cannot find that 
the reference in the job description to the assistance that 
a manager should give to the Authority in contract 
negotiations contemplates any more than that which was 
referred to in the trial examiner's statement - the mere 
making of recommendations to the Authority at a time when it 
formulated its negotiation posture. The Director properly 
determined that this was not sufficient involvement in 
negotiations to constitute a managerial activity. 
The reference in the job description to the managers' 
participation in labor-management sessions is also without 
significance in the absence of evidence concerning the 
jurisdiction of the labor-management committees. Indeed, 
such committees often deal with matters that are not 
mandatory subjects of negotiation and are of a mundane 
Board - E-0846 
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nature which would not demonstrate that participants therein 
were exercising a "major role in the administration of 
agreements or in personnel administration". 
The Authority's brief suggests that its management 
functions are centralized and that the managerial functions 
are exercised by the Executive Director and his Deputy. 
This is consistent with the evidence before us which shows 
the responsibilities of the bridge managers to be 
supervisory. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director. 
and 
WE ORDER that the application herein 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 14. 19 83 
Albany, New York 
Sea 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2C-l/14/83 
In the Matter of 
ELBA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-55I2 
-and-
ELBA NON-TEACHING ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
HARRIS. BEACH, WILCOX. RUBIN & LEVEY. ESQS. 
(A. TERRY VAN HOUTEN. ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
SMITH & DOERR. ESQS. (LEE SMITH, ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Elba Non-Teaching Association (Association) filed a 
charge alleging that it represents bus drivers employed by 
the Elba Central School District (District)— and that the 
District unilaterally decided to subcontract its bus 
services. The hearing officer found merit in the charge. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the District 
to the hearing officer's decision. 
I/The Association and the District have entered into 
at least four multi-year collective bargaining agreements 
which specify the terms and conditions of employment of the 
bus drivers, cafeteria workers and clerical employees. 
8if!0 
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The District does not deny that it decided unilaterally 
to subcontract its bus services to the Genesee Bus Company. 
It defends that unilateral action by arguing that the 
Association is not an employee organization and therefore 
-._ - -~-has--no--T-ay^  
drivers. It argues further that even if the Association has 
any right to negotiate on behalf of the bus drivers, it 
waived its right to negotiate the subcontracting issue. 
Both these arguments were presented to the hearing 
officer who determined that the evidence did not support the 
positions of the District. In support of its exceptions, 
) the District argues that the hearing officer erred in his 
conclusions. It also argues that in reciting the evidence 
upon which he based his conclusions, the hearing officer 
overlooked evidence that supports its contention that the 
Association waived any right it may have had to negotiate 
the decision to subcontract bus services. This refers to 
evidence that in 1979 the District announced that it was 
considering subcontracting its cafeteria services. After 
the 1979 announcement, the cafeteria workers discussed the 
matter with representatives of the District which led to 
arrangements between the parties modifying the manner in 
which food services were provided. This, in turn, persuaded 
the District not to subcontract its cafeteria services. 
j 
C 3910 
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The District contends that the Association's experience 
regarding the contemplated subcontracting of the cafeteria 
services two years earlier was sufficient to put it on 
notice that it could have negotiated the decision to 
subcontract bus services. Thus, according to the District, 
the Association's failure to make appropriate riegbtiation 
proposals in the month that followed its notice of intention 
to subcontract demonstrated a lack of interest in 
negotiating. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the hearing 
officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
Association was an employee organization which had a Taylor 
Law right to negotiate the District's decision to 
subcontract its bus services. The record evidence cited by 
the hearing officer makes this clear. It is also clear that 
the Association did not waive its right to negotiate the 
District's decision to subcontract its bus services. The 
evidence cited by the District does not compel a contrary 
conclusion. In CSEA v. Newman. 88 AD2d 685. 15 PERB T7011 
(3rd Dept. 1982), appeal dismissed for want of a final 
determination. 57 NY2d 775, 15 PERB T7020 (1982). the 
Appellate Division rejected an argument that an employee 
organization's failure to file a demand constituted a waiver 
of its right to negotiate the subject. The Court said (at 
p. 686): 
911' 
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A waiver is "the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right with both knowledge of its 
existence and an intention to relinquish it" 
[citations omitted]. Such a waiver must be 
clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity. ; 
This record contains no evidence of an 
explicit, unmistakable, unambiguous waiver of 
CSEA's right to negotiate. CSEA's failure to 
demand negotiations may have been 
inexplicable, but it should not be construed 
as a waiver. Respondent improperly imputed 
;to^ SEA~nrhi^ n^treTtft^  —-—-.-_.—-
negotiate by virtue of its failure to demand 
negotiations. 
This holding is dispositive of the District's argument that 
the Association waived its right to negotiate the decision 
to subcontract bus services. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the District to: 
1. Forthwith offer reinstatement under 
their prior terms and conditions of 
employment to those employees 
terminated as a result of the contract 
with the Genesee Bus Company, together 
with any loss of wages or benefits that 
they may have suffered by reason of 
such contract; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the 
Association concerning the terms and 
conditions of employment of the 
reinstated employees since July 1. 
1981;-7 
£/The Association-District 1980-81 contract expired on 
the effective date of the termination of the bus drivers. 
The successor contract contains no reference to bus drivers. 
U-5512 
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3. Post copies of the Notice attached hereto in 
all locations normally used to communicate 
with unit employees. 
January 14. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees represented by the Elba Non-Teaching 
Association that.the Elba Central School District will: 
1. Forthwith offer reinstatement under their prior 
terms and conditions of employment to those employees 
terminated as a result of the contract with the Genesee 
Bus Company, together with any loss of wages or benefits 
that they may have suffered by reason of such contract, and 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Association concerning 
the terms and conditions of employment of the reinstated 
employees since July 1, 1981. 
Elba Central School District 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered.. 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-l/14/83 
In the Matter of 
QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
. __. _____ __ Respondent, ••_ 
~" CASE"NO7"U^39"08~ 
-and-
QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY GUILD. 
LOCAL 1321, DISTRICT COUNCIL 37. 
AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
JACKSON, LEWIS. SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN. ESQS . 
(ANTHONY H. ATLAS. ESQ. and KAREN Y. TERAGAWA. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
BEVERLY GROSS. ESQ. (IRVING H. GLASGOW, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Queens 
Borough Public Library (Queens Borough) to a hearing 
officer's decision that, in 1978, it unilaterally eliminated 
two floating bonus holidays which had been enjoyed by 
employees represented by Queens Borough Public Library 
Guild, Local 1321, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Guild). Queens Borough acknowledges that it made the 
unilateral change but it argues that the Guild waived 
Board - U-3908 -2 
whatever right it may have had to negotiate the matter. 
In part. Queens Borough relies upon the fact that an 
impasse panel of New York City's Office of Collective 
Bargaining ruled that after 1977, negotiations concerning 
-—-—the—bonus~hoi-idays -should -take- place-_a± --the-_city_-TvwicLe_ 
level. At the time of the impasse panel award. Queens 
Borough was a participant in city-wide negotiations, in 
which it was represented by the City. The Guild was 
represented in those negotiations by District Council 37. 
Before the 1978 negotiations commenced. Queens Borough 
exercised its right to withdraw from the city-wide 
negotiations. It, nevertheless, argues that the Guild 
waived its right to negotiate the subject of the bonus 
holidays because that subject was not raised at the 
city-wide negotiations. In justification of this position, 
it asserts that, pursuant to the impasse panel award, the 
subject had to be negotiated at the city-wide negotiations 
or not at all. However, by reason of its withdrawal from 
-i-^It also argues that this Board has no jurisdiction 
over it because it is not a public employer. That argument 
was rejected by us at 13 PERB ir3056 (1980). Queens 
Borough's appeal from that decision was dismissed by the 
Appellate Division as premature. Queens Borough Public 
Library v. PERB. 83 AD2d 637. 14 PERB 117022 (2d Dept. . 1981). 
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coverage under the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, 
it could no longer have made a demand concerning this 
subject in those negotiations. Thus, according to Queens 
Borough, the Guild should have seen to it that District 
Council _37 _r;ais_ed_th.e_ i:SS:ue_„0:n. its_ beJialf _.:.^___•-..__ -. :__^-:_._. 
The hearing officer ruled that this argument 
misconstrued the impasse panel award. He found that the 
award merely changed the locus of bargaining from unit 
negotiations to city-wide negotiations. It did not convert 
Queens Borough's obligation to make a demand to change the 
status quo into a Guild obligation to make a demand to 
) maintain the status quo. We affirm this analysis of the 
hearing officer. We also note that just as Queens Borough's 
withdrawal from coverage under the New York City Collective 
Bargaining Law deprived it of a right to make demands at the 
city-wide negotiations, that withdrawal also insulated it 
from having to respond to demands made of it in those 
negotiations. This, in turn, relieved the Guild of any 
obligation it might have had to make demands of Queens 
Borough at those negotiations. 
Queens Borough's second argument is based upon the fact 
that it had eliminated floating bonus holidays unilaterally 
in 1974, 1975 and 1976. It argues that this past conduct 
was sufficient to put the Guild on notice that it would 
) 
again eliminate the holidays in 1978. This, according to 
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Queens Borough, imposed a burden upon the Guild to demand 
their continuation during negotiations. The Guild did not 
do so and, therefore, according to Queens Borough, it waived 
its right to such negotiations. In support of this 
argumeTrtT Quee'ns"^ or"ough cites State of New York (SUNYA), 13 
PERB 1P044 (1980), in which we held that under similar 
circumstances. CSEA waived its right to negotiate the 
unilateral elimination of a holiday by the State. 
The Guild argues that Queens Borough's unilateral 
actions in 1974-76 did not constitute notice that it would 
again act unilaterally in 1978 because the Office of 
Collective Bargaining impasse panel compelled it to 
compensate the employees for the holidays lost in those 
years. This is a persuasive argument, but even more 
significant is the reversal of State of New York (SUNYA) by 
the Appellate Division. CSEA v. Newman. 88 AD2d 685, 15 
PERB 1f7011 (3rd Dept. 1982), appeal dismissed for want of a 
final determination, 57 NY2d 775. 15 PERB ir7020 (1982). The 
Appellate Division held that when a public employer acts 
unilaterally, the failure of the employee organization to 
demand negotiations cannot be deemed a waiver. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
WE ORDER Queens Borough, at its option. 
either to award all eligible employees 
Board - U-3908 
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the bonus days in kind or to liquidate 
the entitlement of employees to bonus 
days by cash payments in accordance 
with the terms of the collective 
ba-rga-in-i-ng-ag-r-eement—in- eff-f ee-t—at -the~ —•-- — 
time of the violation. If Queens 
Borough elects to award bonus days in 
kind, such days may be taken by the 
employees at any time, subject to such 
administrative limitations as existed 
in the past.2/ 
DATED: January 14, 1983 
Albany, New York 
i/we do not order Queens Borough to negotiate in good 
faith with respect to bonus days because it has negotiated 
this matter with the Guild for the years subsequent to 1978. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
. #2E-l/14/83 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
LOCAL 2, AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. UJ:6262 
~"" ~" " "-and-" "" """ 
HARVEY M. ELENTUCK. 
Charging Party. 
HARVEY M. ELENTUCK. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Harvey M. 
Elentuck to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his 
charge against United Federation of Teachers, Local 2. AFT, 
AFL-CIO (UFT) on the ground that the facts as alleged did 
not constitute a violation. The charge alleges that UFT 
refused to grieve an action of Elentuck's employer denying 
him an incremental wage increase after Elentuck1s principal 
gave him an unsatisfactory rating. The basis for UFT's 
refusal was that it never grieves such cases. 
The charge shows that Elentuck, a teacher employed by 
the New York City School District (District), was denied a 
salary increment because his school principal gave him an 
unsatisfactory rating. Relying upon UFT's agreement with 
120 
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the District which provides that all regularly appointed 
teachers will advance to the next step, Elentuck claims that 
he too should have received an increment. Elentuck's papers 
indicate that under the regulations of the District's 
Chancellor, a teacher receiving an unsatisfactory rating by 
the superintendent is not eligible for increments. Without 
specifically challenging the Chancellor's regulations as 
being in violation of the contract, Elentuck contends that 
the unsatisfactory rating which he received from his 
principal is not covered by the regulation.— 
Elentuck asked UFT to grieve the denial of the 
increment, but UFT refused. In refusing. UFT informed 
Elentuck that it never files a grievance in a case such as 
2/ 
this. Elentuck does not challenge UFT's statement.— but 
he argues that such a blanket refusal by UFT constitutes 
gross negligence in that it leaves "several hundred teachers 
i^The charge does not allege that Elentuck asked UFT 
to represent him in an appeal from the unsatisfactory 
rating. This Board has found that UFT represents unit 
employees at such hearings. See UFT (Barnett). 14 PERB 
ir3017 (1981). 
^Based upon a newspaper report. Elentuck alleges that 
a salary reduction imposed upon another teacher because that 
teacher received a poor evaluation was restored with the 
help of his employee organization. On its face, that 
allegation concerns a teacher employed by a different school 
district and represented by a different employee 
organization. The allegation is therefore irrelevant to the 
matter before us because it does not indicate that UFT 
discriminated against Elentuck. 
m 
t\Jt 
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[a] year . . . unjustly financially penalized as I was. and 
still the UFT has done nothing to recover the money for the 
members . . . ." 
We affirm the decision of the Director. This Board has 
held that a union violates its duty of fair representation 
if it is improperly motivated, grossly negligent or 
irresponsible in withholding a service from a unit 
employee. Brighton Transportation Association. 10 PERB 
3/ ir3090 (1977).- On the face of the charge. UFT's conduct 
was not improperly motivated, i.e. it was not 
discriminatory. It was also not negligent, UFT having made 
a considered decision not to take the grievance. The only 
basis for the charge therefore would be that UFT's conduct 
was irresponsible. However, the language of the contract 
should be understood in the light of the past practice that 
only employees rated as satisfactory get increments. UFT's 
blanket refusal to take such grievances suggests an 
implicit, if not an explicit, agreement with the District 
permitting the District to withhold increments from teachers 
who are rated unsatisfactory by their principals. It is not 
irresponsible for UFT to enter into such an agreement. 
1/see also Vaca v. Sipes. 386 US 161 (1967); Ruzicka 
v. General Motors. 523 F2d 306 (1975). 
Board - U-6262 _4 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: January 14. 19 83 





STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
















Case No. C-2502 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters, Local 237 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Head Cook, Food Service Worker, Driver. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
ii 
Certification - C-2502 page 2 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters, Local 237 and enter 
into a written agreement with such employee organization with 
regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances. 
DATED: January 14, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold Rx Newman, Chairman 
-^A^vt^> 
David C. Randies, Member 
I, Harold R. Newman, Chairman, Public Employment Relations Board, 
hereby certify that at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, held on January 14, 1983 at Albany, New York, 
such Board, pursuant to the authority vested in it by Article 14 of the 
Civil Service Law, unanimously adopted the attached amendments to Part 
..20_l„of_-„its_ Rules., ..A,N^ ^ 
upon filing with the Secretary of State. 
A notice of proposed agency action was published in the Register 
on December 15, 1982. No other prior notice of this action was required 
by statute. 
DATE: January 17, 1983 
A 
A . /yi-kT-x-^u^, 
HAROLD R. NEWMAN 
Chairman 
iUi 
Section 201.2 of the Rules of the Public Employment 
Relations Board (4 NYCRR, Chapter VII) is hereby amended by reletter-
ing subdivision (b) to be subdivision (c) and by adding thereto a new 
subdivision to be subdivision (b) to read as follows: 
(b) Notwithstanding sections 201.3 and 201.4 of these 
Rules, a petition may be filed by a public employer or a recognized or 
certified employee organization to clarify whether a new or substant-
ially altered position is encompassed within the scope of an existing 
junit, or to determine the unit placement of a new or substantially 
altered position. The filing and processing of the petition shall be 
in accordance with sections 201.5(c), 201.7(a) and (d), 201.8, 201.9 
(a)-(f), and 201.11 of these Rules. In determining the unit placement 
of any new or substantially altered position, the Director shall con-
sider whether the placement would be consistent with the criteria set 
forth in section 207 of the Act. The Director may decline to make 
any clarification or placement not otherwise consistent with the pur-
poses or policies of the Act. Exceptions to any determination of the 
Director may be filed pursuant to section 201.12 of these Rules. 
The title of Section 201.5 of such Rules is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
Contents of Petition for Certification; Contents of 
Petition for Decertification; Contents of Petition to Clarify Existing 
Unit or to Determine Unit Placement of New or Substantially Altered 
Positions. 
Section 201.5 of such Rules is hereby amended by adding 
^thereto a new subdivision (c) to read as follows: 
(c) Petitions filed pursuant-to section 201.2(b) shall 
contain the following: 
(1) The name, affiliation, if any, and address of the 
recognized or certified employee organization. 
(2) The name and address of the public employer involve 
(3) A description of any affected existing negotiating 
unit, a copy of any applicable certification or recognition, and the 
date thereof. 
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(4) The number of employees in the existing unit and in 
the unit proposed in the petition 
(5) The job description and classification of each ne w 
or substantially altered position and the date of its establishment. 
(6) The name and address of any other employee organiza-
tion which claims to represent the new or substantially altered posit-
ion , 
(7) A copy of any contract affecting the new or substan-
tially altered position. 
(8) A statement by the petitioner setting forth the 
details of the desired clarification or placement and the reasons 
therefor. 
